Castañón Nava v. DHS: A Seventh Circuit Motions Panel Rejects the Government’s Detention Theory
- Citation
- Castañón Nava v. DHS, No. 25-3050 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2025) (motions panel order); underlying N.D. Ill. interim release order Nov. 13, 2025 (Cummings, J.)
- Court
- U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- Statute
- 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); 2022 Castañón Nava consent decree; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(2), 1226(a)
- Holding
- Government’s motion to stay interim release order denied; DHS unlikely to succeed on merits, including on theory that all EWI noncitizens are subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention. Underlying merits argued February 2026.
“Operation Midway Blitz,” conducted by ICE in the Chicago metropolitan area in fall 2025, swept up approximately 3,368 noncitizens. Approximately 1,800 of them were detained. Many were class members under the longstanding 2022 consent decree in Castañón Nava v. DHS, which had imposed warrantless-arrest constraints on ICE in the Northern District of Illinois.
Judge Sara Cummings of the Northern District of Illinois extended the consent decree in October 2025 in light of repeated violations and entered an interim release order under Alternatives to Detention on November 13, 2025. The government sought a stay from the Seventh Circuit. On December 11, 2025, the motions panel denied the stay.
The motions panel order
Although a motions order is not binding precedent in the Seventh Circuit, the December 11 order is unusually substantive. The panel found DHS unlikely to succeed on the merits of multiple arguments, including the theory that all EWI class members are subject to § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention and statutorily ineligible for the relief Judge Cummings had ordered. The panel noted the consensus among district courts nationwide rejecting that theory, the textual difficulties with the government’s reading, and the absence of any contemporaneous BIA or DOJ position supporting the reclassification before May 2025.
The panel also rejected DHS’s argument that the 2022 consent decree had been superseded by the post-July 2025 enforcement directive. Consent decrees, the panel observed, are binding judicial orders that can be modified only through the procedures specified in Rule 60 or by negotiated amendment, not by unilateral agency repudiation.
“A consent decree is not a courtesy the Government may withdraw when it ceases to find compliance convenient.”
Significance
The Seventh Circuit’s motions panel ruling is the first federal appellate signal — even in motions posture — rejecting the post-July 2025 mandatory-detention framework on the merits. Coming two months before the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, it set up the cleanest possible inter-circuit conflict on the central detention question of the era. The Seventh Circuit heard the underlying merits in early February 2026; a published opinion is expected before the end of the term.
Operationally, the consent-decree dimension of Castañón Nava is also worth noting. The case is one of a small number of structural-reform decrees governing ICE enforcement in particular regions; courts have generally proven unwilling to permit the agency to walk away from such decrees as enforcement priorities change. Castañón Nava is now an important data point for the proposition that 2010s-era consent decrees retain meaningful force against 2020s-era enforcement intensification.
Filed under Pre-Removal Detention. Published December 11, 2025.